Coercion or Cost-Decrease: Why Do Firms Pay Influences?

  • Israel Odion E. Idewele Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Cyprus International University, Turkey
  • Peter Eriki Department of Banking and Finance, University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria
  • Murad A. Bein Department of Accounting and Finance, Cyprus International University, Turkey
  • M. Yoserizal Saragih Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatera Utara, Indonesia
Keywords: coercion; corruption; extortion, bribery, government authority


It has been observed that Firms Influence Government Authorities by paying Bribe to them. This paper examines how gift is related with the potential for the firm to discover legitimate government authorities. This paper attempts to ascertain why firms pay bribes. More specifically, does it appear that firms are being extorted or is it more likely that they are using bribes as a tool to avoid regulation?  In the event that organizations that report more prominent chances to discover government authority pay bribe, at that point this is an indication that rewards originated from coercion in light of the fact that the nearness of such authorities ought not make any difference for firms needing to pay bribe to reduced costs. We find out that influences emerge because of coercion in spite of the fact that result fairly debilitate in the most current study. If corrupt individuals are more likely to enter into environments that allow them to extract bribes, then honest could be endogenous and driven by the prevalence and magnitude of bribery.


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How to Cite
Israel Odion E. Idewele, Peter Eriki, Murad A. Bein, & M. Yoserizal Saragih. (2021). Coercion or Cost-Decrease: Why Do Firms Pay Influences?. Konfrontasi: Jurnal Kultural, Ekonomi Dan Perubahan Sosial, 8(2), 65-77.