

## The Anarchist and Terrorist in Indonesia: A Theoretical Reflection

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**Abstract:** *In the Indonesian context, acts of anarchism and terrorism by the Jamaah Islamiyah group and the Ansarut Daulah Congregation have a common thread with the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia, especially in relation to acts of violence that claimed human lives. In this case, religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, became ideological opposition is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. Indonesia's Islamic ideology in this period appeared in its roughest form: terrorism. Recognition of an act of terrorism suspects Bali Bombing October 12, 2002, a clear expression of religious emotion. Even, Ali Gufon, one of the Bali bombing terror perpetrators, a member of Jamaah Islamiyyah, had expressed his attitude to the firm and simple: as a reply to injustice and tyranny US and its allies against Muslims with the intention that they stop their tyranny.*

**Keywords:** *anarchist; terrorist; Indonesia*

### I. Introduction

So far, our understanding of the motivations and causes of terrorism helps to frame a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Terrorists are not a homogeneous group. Their roots are diverse, not being the same from place to place. Some see themselves as legitimate geopolitical actors, while others are nothing more than gangs or thrill-kill cults. The history of theoretical effort at understanding terrorism comes from the subfield of collective violence in the field of political science, and indeed, prior to the emergence of criminal justice as a separate discipline in the early 1970s, it can be safely said that political science pretty much had a monopoly over theories of terrorism, followed perhaps by the disciplines of religion and economics.

Sociological, psychological, and criminological theories have also certainly had a role to play with some relevance. We will begin, first, with the theories of political violence, and it is customary to say at this point that none of the following ideologies, or any ideology for that matter, are being advocated. The purpose is to provide an objective overview of theories, concepts, causal factors, and models. The underlying concern should be to answer the questions "Why Does Terrorism Occur?" or "What Causes It?" rather than pass judgment or assess any of the theories at this point. With the political theories, we shall see that it is often the form of governance which is the main cause of terrorism, and with the other theories, we will find a number of subcultural and personality factors at work. With other theories, such as sociology, we will see how things like the interplay between social movements and societal response can explain terrorism.

## **II. Review of Literature**

### **2.1 Anarchist**

Anarchism is a theory of governance that rejects any form of central or external authority, preferring instead to replace it with alternative forms of organization such as shaming rituals for deviants, mutual assistance pacts between citizens, syndicalism (any non-authoritarian organizational structure that gives the greatest freedom to workers), iconoclasm (the destruction of cherished beliefs), libertarianism (a belief in absolute liberty), and plain old rugged individualism. Anarchism is often referred to as the nineteenth century roots of terrorism, the term first being introduced in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Anarchism defined is the rejection of the state, of any form of coercive government, of any form of domination and exploitation. It is the notion of free and equal access to all the world's resources to enable positive freedom (freedom to) in place of negative freedom (freedom from, or the basis of most constitutional rights).

As a theory, anarchism holds a unique place in history because it was the first revolutionary movement to come up with systematic ideas about the purpose of agitation. You'll recognize some of these ideas as terrorist tactics, but it's important first to understand them in the context of anarchism. Proudhon contributed the idea of finding the "moment" as in when the moment is ripe for revolutionary action. Another anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, popularized the idea of "propaganda by deed" or letting your actions speak for themselves, which was a theory originally developed by Carlo Pisacane, an Italian revolutionary who argued that ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around.

Over the years, this notion has evolved into a fairly competent philosophy of the bomb as part of a propaganda campaign to stimulate awareness and sympathy with the cause, and in this respect has been noted as a defining feature of terrorism (Georges-Abeyie & Hass, 1982).

Bakunin's ideas strongly influenced anarchism because his concept of propaganda by deed also included a prohibition against large scale group action (it being better, he thought, for anarchist action to be individualized or done in small groups). Most anarchists operate on the principle of leaderless resistance, or acting on your own, with little knowledge or support of the groups they may belong to.

Another anarchist, Sergei Nachaev, who was an associate of Bakunin, glorified the "merciless" aspect of destruction, but it was Bakunin who laid out the six steps necessary to destroy a social structure, as paraphrased as: (1) Kill the intelligensia (kill those who are intelligent and most energetic in society); (2) Kidnap the rich and powerful (those who will yield the biggest ransoms); (3) Infiltrate the politicians (to find out their secrets and discredit them); (4) Help the guilty criminals (to confuse society over justice and punishment); (5) Defend the loudmouths (those who make dangerous declarations); (6) Nurture the supporters (help fellow travelers who believe in societal destruction).

Major anarchist figures, like Karl Heinzen and Johann Most, contributed the idea that murder, especially murder-suicide, constituted the highest form of revolutionary struggle. Both advocated the use of weapons of mass destruction. Other anarchists contributed different ideas, such as Peter Kropotkin's notion of "propaganda by word" or radicalizing the public by use of subversive publications. Anarchism (like fascism) has also had some influential female figures, and Emma Goldman (1869-1940) comes to mind as a early founder of free speech and sexual freedom movements. Minor figures in the history of anarchism, like Charles Gallo,

Auguste Vaillante, Emile Henry, and Claudius Konigstein advocated the idea that to have the most effect, the targets must be innocents (in places such as crowded dance halls or shopping centers) or symbols of economic success (like banks and stock exchanges). It may be worth noting, in passing, that the famous Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, developed his notion of the "born criminal" in part by being called in to examine the physical features of some minor anarchists who were really nothing more than criminals justifying their behavior with anarchist talk.

## **2.2 Terrorist**

Terrorism is most definitely not a form of governance, but anarchism is. Most anarchists reject terrorism in its vanguard varieties (for nationalist or religious purposes), but in a theoretical sense, anarchism justifies terrorism as a form of criminal action that attacks the values of an organized, complacent society.

Terrorists are not a homogeneous group. Their roots are diverse, not being the same from place to place. Some see themselves as legitimate geopolitical actors, while others are nothing more than gangs or thrill-kill cults. The history of theoretical effort at understanding terrorism comes from the subfield of collective violence in the field of political science, and indeed, prior to the emergence of criminal justice as a separate discipline in the early 1970s, it can be safely said that political science pretty much had a monopoly over theories of terrorism, followed perhaps by the disciplines of religion and economics.

## **III. Discussion**

For purpose of balance, it is important to point out that anarchism today does not support terrorism. It has historically supported terrorism and even today might support some acts of terrorism, but there are only weak theoretical links between the two, most strongly with the propaganda by deed concept. Anarchists hold to a doctrine that anarchy must be created in the act of self-liberation from oppressive and coercive relationships. You don't blow up the relationship as terrorists do; instead, you convince others that grounds for the existing relationship must be blown up.

Anarchism is not really about mad bombing or chaos. Terrorists target people; anarchists target things such as institutions and structures. Bakunin did not want the death of people but the destruction of things and positions of authority. Only a small minority of terrorists have ever been anarchists, and only a small minority of anarchists have ever been terrorists. Anarchists of almost all stripes do not believe in prisons or keeping prisoners in cells.

In fact, there is an area of study called anarchist criminology, a controversial subfield of critical criminology which celebrates the difficulties anarchism has had finding a workable definition (Tifft 1979; Ferrell 1997). Anarchist criminology advocates the abolishment of criminal justice systems. It argues that much harm has been committed in the name of reasonableness, and anarchist criminology is committed to promoting the unthinkable and unreasonable. Like other subfields of critical criminology, anarchist criminology views the state as an inherently oppressive entity, and anarchist justice not only promotes social justice (equal access to all resources), but protects diversity and difference among people (Ferrell 1999).

Theological transformation that supports terrorism would be the notion that communal violence, even though violence is despised, is still a form of worship that may help discover the true nature of God and open up two-way communication with God (God to human).

Religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics. Not only does it strive to avenge a long history of persecution and injustice, but it frequently carries out preemptive attacks. This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about the actual degree of threat that the enemy trend poses. Rarely are religious terrorists swayed by secular sources of information about the degree of actual threat, but instead are driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of Holy Scriptures.

This results in two things: (1) a rather non-selective targeting pattern, lashing out blindly, often harming innocents; and (2) the creation of numerous offshoot, spin-off, or fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission imperative. Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like alienated and marginal members of society, and you've got a recipe for perhaps the most dangerous or prolific kind of terrorism in the world today.

Most religious terrorist groups can trace their origin to key historical events. Institutional memory is long, as the example of Irish terrorism points out, and it is not uncommon for the group to conduct rituals designed to "never forget" some long-ago grievance. In one sense, this is why religious terrorism is popular, because political terrorism, like politics, has a much shorter memory. Another variety of religious terrorism has its roots in millenarianism, where the key event is some doomsday or apocalyptic date where something was supposed to happen.

We know from studies of UFO cults that such groups are often more dangerous after an event fails to happen because of cognitive dissonance, which forces a rearrangement of attitudes and beliefs that are frequently more rigid and fantastic. However, political events also serve as the catalyst for religious terrorism, and these are usually tied into whatever messianic traditions the religion has. For example, the rise of al-Ikhwan Muslim militancy can be traced to a date in 1979 (during the Islamic year 1400) when the return of the prophet Madhi was anticipated at the Grand Mosque of Ka'bah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Adherents of the belief stormed the mosque by force, which happened to coincide with a time for pilgrimage and the height of the tourist season. The government reacted by forcing the militants out, cementing forever a date of infamy in which the group became certain that the homeland needed rescuing from secularization.

Religious terrorists also typically have "mourning periods" or dates such as "anniversary of the martyrs" because these activities are important ways the group recruits true believers from those who have been standing on the sidelines. Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good. The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of experimentation.

It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the terrorist context. Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes after their death, but a whole mythology develops around them, which might be called a process of martyrology (Ranstorp 1996). Targets are chosen not for strategic purposes, but for symbolic purposes, and the repercussions

of an attack are managed as well. The ideal target is one in which the martyr can inflict more damage than is expected for their size.

The idea is to produce an impression that the group is larger and more powerful than it actually is. This feeling of power is enhanced by the use of anonymity, whereby the martyr goes through an indoctrination process where they are stripped of their real identity and provided with a false background history. The process goes much further than establishing a cover story in case of capture. The process involves changing the family name and home town the martyr came from, so that any repercussions or reactions to the terrorist event can be channeled toward another family or town. In some cases, the cover story is used to direct government counterterrorism toward the wrong target (especially if the martyr's family is well known and the town is small). In other cases, it is used to give the impression that dozens of martyrs are coming from the same town, when in fact they are not.

In all fairness, it should be said that most militant religious groups only adopt terrorism as a tactic of last resort. We have not discussed Just War Doctrine here, but ethics and/or fair play are integral parts of most religions, and there are usually unwritten rules for when the cosmic struggle (as Juergensmeyer 2001 calls it) spills over into political struggle. Religious terrorists demonstrate marvelous ingenuity in means, methods, and timing, but their targeting is flawed, and one can only wonder how strategically effective is their "symbolic" success from "striking at the heart of the infidels." Perhaps the whole reason for it is to bolster their reputation among other religious communities. This would be supported by the fact that some terrorist acts are scheduled on dates specifically designed to desecrate a competitor's religious holidays and sacred moments.

The discipline of economics has many concepts that are relevant to an understanding of terrorism --supply and demand-- costs and benefits, etc. Fully-developed economic or econometric models of terrorism are quite rare, however, and often involve such things as "psychic" costs and benefits (Nyatepe-Coo 2004). More down-to-earth economic theories can be found in the literature on deterrence. Rational choice theory, in particular, has found a place in criminology, and holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss. Criminals must come to believe their actions will be beneficial --to themselves, their community, or society-- and they must come to see that crime pays, or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation.

Perhaps the most well-known version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to occur: (1) suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed and alienated. Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of decision making. In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into criminology, the Olson hypothesis (source unknown) suggests that participants in revolutionary violence predicate their behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to pursue the best course of action given the social circumstances.

Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that people can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational decisions for them as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important and their personal contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may have for the "free rider"



problem (Muller and Opp 1986). For those unfamiliar with it, the "free rider" problem is a classic paradox in social science and economics which asks why anybody should do something for the public good when most likely someone else will get credit for it and most everybody else will benefit merely by sitting idly and doing nothing. Perhaps the most eloquent spokesperson for rational choice ideas in the field of terrorism is Wesleyan professor Martha Crenshaw (1998), whose writings inform my remarks below.

A typical terrorist event that involves hostage-taking and all-too-frequent hostage-killing. From an individualist rational point of view, the best choice would be to keep at least some of the hostages alive in order to bargain with the government for leniency. Yet, often a collectivist rational mentality sets in, and the group choice (or groupthink) is to kill all the hostages. Is this killing senseless, the product of deranged minds, or an example of mob behavior? The answer is NO on all points from a rational choice point of view. It may be a reasonable and calculated response to circumstances. It may involve a collective judgment about the most efficient course of action that has the most lasting impact on observers (for social learning purposes). And most importantly, the senselessness of it all may be just what the group needs to make their ideological point that they are terrorists, not just ordinary criminals.

The causal models of sociology rather than worry about perspectives can be seen regardless of the name for the theoretical viewpoint, one is likely to encounter the following, or some variation of them, as causal factors in almost all etiological, sociology-related thinking: (1) the frustration-aggression hypothesis; (2) the relative deprivation hypothesis; (3) the negative identity hypothesis; (4) the narcissistic rage hypothesis; (5) the moral disengagement hypothesis.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is the idea that every frustration (not being able to engage in some behavior) leads to some form of aggression, and that every aggressive act relieves that frustration to some extent. A professor we had once referred to it as the "flush-toilet" model of motivation because the basic notion is that stress and hassles build up until they reach a point that "breaks the camel's back" and the displacement of released energy provides some benefit in terms of catharsis or ventilation. Psychologists tend to view it as a drive theory which explains many kinds of behavior, but other disciplines tend to think of it as the causes of social strife which arise when some government policy (or social structural condition brought on by government policy) alienates and angers people. Students should be advised that very sophisticated models of this hypothesis exist in criminology, and that my description is only a crude simplification. Gurr (1970) provides the best overview of the many contours of this hypothesis.

The relative deprivation hypothesis is the idea that as a person goes about choosing their values and interests, they compare what they have and don't have, as well as what they want or don't want, with real or imaginary others. The observation or perception of deprivation is what matters, as well as an environment of rising expectations. The person then usually perceives a discrepancy between what is possible for them and what is possible for others, and reacts to it with an inflamed sense of injustice. Students should be advised that debates exist within criminology regarding relative deprivation and terrorism, on the one hand, within the anomie or strain traditions which sometimes find causal influence in such objective factors as Gross Domestic Product, and on the other hand, in somewhat trivial and subjective feelings of discomfort as everyday stresses and strains. Davies (1962) pioneered the application of this

hypothesis to terrorism; Gurr (1970) expanded on it; and today, there is a plethora of research on all sorts of "economic" factors such as unemployment, inequality, repression, and globalization as causes of terrorism.

The negative identity hypothesis is the idea that, for whatever reason, a person develops a vindictive and covert rejection of the roles and statuses laid out for them by their family, community, or society. For example, a child raised in a well-to-do family may secretly sabotage every effort made to hand them the good life on a "silver platter," deliberately screwing up in school, at work, and everywhere else until the day comes, with some apparent life-altering experience (like engaging in terrorism), that the long-nurtured negative identity comes out, and the subject can then make it feel more like a total identity transformation. Students should be advised that there are many varieties of this idea that exist in a number of theories across many fields of study, but as the esteemed psychologist Erik Erikson put it -- "It's better to have a negative identity than none at all."

The narcissistic rage hypothesis is an umbrella idea for all the numerous things that can go wrong in child-rearing, such as too much smothering, too little smothering, ineffective discipline, overly stringent discipline, psychological trauma, coming from a broken home, etc., that all leads to the same effect of a "What about Me?" reaction in the child. It is actually a two-way process with the child contributing as much as the parents and other role models which results in a damaged self-concept, a tendency to blame others for one's inadequacies, and the well-known "splitting" of self into a "good me" and "bad me" which often forms the basis for personality disorders involving a lack of empathy for the suffering of others. Students should be advised that there is not all that much consensus on the primal importance of narcissism, and that the literature on child-rearing is full of mixed empirical results. Kohut's (1972) treatise on the subject is a definitive analysis of the revenge-driven fantasies which fuel the groundless accusations and oversensitivity to slight that characterize narcissistic rage.

The moral disengagement hypothesis encompasses many of the ways a person neutralizes or removes any inhibitions they have about committing acts of horrific violence. Some common patterns include imagining one's self as a hero, portraying one's self as agentless, minimizing the harm done, dehumanizing the victim, or insulating one's self in routine activities. Organized crime figures, for example, usually hide behind family activities with their wives and children. Students should be advised that in the study of terrorism, numerous ways have been found for terrorists to rationalize their behavior which go far beyond denigrating one's enemies and beefing one's self up as a crusader (see Hacker 1996). As they exercise deliberate moral agency, terrorists often seek thru their rationalizations to achieve a complete shift in the way government and civil society is perceived. They accomplish this thru "sanitized" language, doublespeak, and euphemistic language (Bandura 2002).

Psychological perspectives, with few exceptions (Ross 1996; 1999), are decidedly clinical in what is often a futile attempt to find something pathological in the terrorist personality. Merari (1990) provides a good overview of psychological approaches, but one of the major names in this area is David Long, former assistant director of the State Department's Office of Counter Terrorism, who has gone on record saying there's no such thing as a terrorist personality, but then has said they typically suffer from low self-esteem, are attracted to groups with charismatic leaders, and enjoy risk-taking (Long 1990). A sampling of

psychological factors that have been investigated include: ineffective parenting or rebellion against one's parents, a pathological need for absolutism, and a variety of other "syndromes" and hypotheses (see Margolin 1977), but study after study for the past thirty years has yielded very little valid and reliable information about the psychology of terrorists other than the following generalizations:

As far as we know, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder, which is reflected by an absence of empathy for the suffering of others. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as "I am good and right. You are bad and wrong." It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people. It is not the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone with low intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above average intelligence and have sophisticated ethical and moral development. A closed-minded certainty is a common feature of terrorist thinking. (Merari 1990).

Although what we don't know about the psychology of terrorism is more than what we do know, there have been several promising attempts to merge or combine psychology with sociology (and criminal justice) into what might be called terrorist profiling (Russell and Miller 1977; Bell 1982; Galvin 1983; Strentz 1988; Hudson 1999). This line of inquiry actually has a long history, and includes what rare studies exist of female terrorists. The earliest study (Russell and Miller 1977) found that the following people tend to join terrorist organizations: 22-25 years of age; 80% male, with women in support roles; 75-80% single; 66% middle or upper class background; 66% some college or graduate work; 42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups; 17% unemployed; 18% strong religious beliefs.

These data, as well as other known characteristics and attributes about terrorists, have found their way into databases, some public, some private. One of the most well-known databases used by researchers is the RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorism. When suicide bombing became popular, Merari (1990) conducted rare interviews with terrorists, and found that most suicide terrorists are between the ages of 16 and 28. Most are male, but 15% are female and that proportion is rising. Many come from poor backgrounds and have limited education, but some have university degrees and come from wealthy families.

We'll return again from time to time to this group of theories, and new developments, because criminology is quite heavily informed by sociology and psychology. What sociological and psychological approaches basically tell us now is that individuals join terrorist organizations in order to commit acts of terrorism, and that this process is the same as when individuals join criminal subcultures in order to commit acts of crime. There appears to be no unique terrorist personality. Instead, there appear to be unique subcultural phenomena which develop, support, and enhance a penchant for cold-blooded, calculated violence which, if not satisfied within a terrorist organization might be fulfilled elsewhere. Terrorism is a social activity. Individuals join a terrorist group usually after they have tried other forms of political involvement. The emotional links between individuals and the strength of commitment to their ideology appear to become stronger by the group living in the



underground and facing adversity in the form of counterterrorism. Socialization in the underground is quite intense, and Ferracuti (1982), a criminologist, has documented the "fantasy wars" that go on in the terrorist underground. An individual's identity may become tied to the group's identity, but it is just as likely that emotional relationships become as important (if not more) than the group's purpose. This means that the distribution of beliefs among members in a terrorist group may be uneven. There may be major differences between individual and group ideology. Ideology may not necessarily be the main component of motivation. From profiling terrorists for many years, we know that most of them are action-hungry practitioners, not theoreticians. This knowledge may provide new counterterrorism strategies which attempt to change individual beliefs and weaken group cohesion.

It's not easy applying traditional criminological theories to terrorism. Most of these theories were designed to explain ordinary street crime like robbery or burglary, and have a certain hardness to their perspectives which makes them difficult to extend. Ruggiero (2005) is typical of those who have attempted to apply such theories or suggest various extensions, starting with Durkheim's functionalism by asking whether Durkheim would see terrorism as part of the "normality of crime" or as part of a clearly unacceptable, dysfunctional form of crime. On the one hand, Durkheim said that all crime serves positive functions (of innovation and evolution), but on the other hand, the organic metaphor that Durkheim used seems to suggest that some forms of crime only cause disintegration and are cancerous. The Chicago school of disorganization in criminology would presumably focus on the distinctiveness of different social worlds between terrorists and non-terrorists, analyzing the communication blockages, for example. Strain theorists would likely argue that terrorism is inevitable as a manifestation of the broken promise that everybody can rise from rags to riches, and study the adaptation Merton described as rebellion. Learning theorists would likely emphasize the importance of role models or the "techniques of neutralization" involved along with the drift into a terrorist lifestyle.

Labeling theorists would probably say, cynically but truly, that terrorism is "what the other person does." Control theorists would likely focus on terrorists being unattached, unloved, uncommitted to education or business, uninvolved in conventional tasks, and having their hands idle so time becomes the "devil's playground" for them. Conflict theorists would probably focus on the presence or absence of associations that provide room for collective action and permanent confrontation, although more radical versions of conflict theory might glamorize terrorism as proto-revolutionary action. Integrated theories would likely focus on the influences of aggressive proneness, provocation, and the support of third parties.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

After the New Order, Indonesia entered a phase of very sharp ideological conflict. Religious ideology, often accompanied by violence and other forms of emotional expression, became ideological opposition is strong enough, even with a relatively small number of supporters. Indonesia's Islamic ideology in this period appeared in its roughest form: terrorism. Recognition of an act of terrorism suspects Bali Bombing October 12, 2002, a clear expression of religious emotion. Ali Gufon, one of the Bali bombing terror perpetrators, a member of Jamaah Islamiyyah, even expressed his attitude to the firm and simple: "...reply to

injustice and tyranny US and its allies against Muslims with the intention that they stop their tyranny."

There is a value work and dictating the way their minds. Ali Ghufon for example, stated that the bombing was "act of devotion to God". So Ali Ghufon, Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and the group felt a delusion of grandeur, a feeling of having or representing or get the word and be part of the elements of greatness which believes itself to carry special mission from God.

The terrorists, the Jamaah islamiyyah or the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) or other factions the Darul Islam, always feel themselves as "God's warriors" who are called to act in the name of God and religion, a "hand of God" on earth to "realize" his wrath in the form of resistance: the bombings and other terrorist acts. Result of interpretation and expression of religious emotion delusive this, the tragedy took place and a large number of speculation arose in the midst of the public.

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The tragedy of a series of terrorist bomb attacks in Bali, Makassar, Jakarta and other places in Indonesia has led to speculation of a series of apologists to the a priori. The first is speculation about who the perpetrators of terror attacks very well planned and carried out by people who have advanced technical knowledge. Arbitrarily identified the culprit as the anti-US, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-capitalist economic strength, and global military. The second is speculation about the motives of the terrorists in action excessive destruction of places of where economic power, politics, and the US military are. The third is speculation about what objectives are to be addressed to the US and Israel. The culprit is allegedly identified as Islamic fundamentalists are now a sworn enemy of the United States, Osama bin Laden is hiding in Afghanistan first. If not Osama, the world assumed that the culprit is the other people from Islamic fundamentalists who have doctrinal relationship with the Al Qaeda network.

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